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Learning from Doing:  
Using Analysis of Fertilizer Demonstration Plots to Improve Programs for 
Stimulating Fertilizer Demand in Rwanda 
 
 
1.  CONTEXT 
 
Since the second half of the 1990s the Government of Rwanda (GOR) has been promoting 
agricultural commercialization and productivity growth as one of the key means of raising 
rural incomes and improving aggregate economic growth. A major component in this strategy 
is the expansion of the use of modern inputs, particularly fertilizers.
1 Many analysts view the 
promotion of some combination of organic and inorganic fertilizers as the most promising 
means of achieving rapid increases in the productivity of land, which is one of the most 
limiting resources in Rwanda. Since 1997 the GOR has made important strides in 
implementing policy reforms designed to stimulate the growth of private sector fertilizer 
markets and projects designed to increase fertilizer demand. Particular attention has been 
given to promoting fertilizers on non-beverage food crops (potatoes, maize, beans, rice, and 
sorghum). This represents a change from past policies where fertilizers were used almost 
exclusively on tea and coffee. Recent growth in both fertilizer demand and supply for these 
non-beverage crops has been encouraging, but there is now concern that the growth is 
beginning to stall. It appears that fertilizer suppliers have responded more strongly to 
government incentives than farmers, making the need to stimulate farmers demand the 
critical challenge at present. 
 
 
2.  OBJECTIVES 
 
The objective of this paper is to stimulate discussion that will lead to the identification of a 
feasible, cost-effective strategy for increasing farmers demand for fertilizer on non-beverage 
food crops in Rwanda.
2 We begin with a summary of accomplishments to date in developing 
fertilizer demand and supply to underscore the importance now given to the demand side. 
This is followed by a discussion of Rwandas recent demonstration plot programsthe 
principle technique used at present to stimulate fertilizer demand. The paper concludes with 




3.  EVOLUTION OF FERTILIZER POLICY 
 
Annex 1 provides a time line of Rwandan fertilizer policy and projects, with a focus on 
developments since 1995. The turning point in fertilizer policy was the GOR decision in 2000 
                                                 
1 Some analysts have expressed an interest in assessing Rwanda’s potential for entering the organic produce 
market and therefore question the wisdom of the current emphasis on inorganic fertilizers. The authors of this 
report consider the organic market an unlikely option in the short- to medium-run given the very high quality 
standards that must be met to supply these markets. 
2 There is also a need to improve fertilizer demand and supply for the tea and coffee sectors and to integrate 
these vertically coordinated market systems with those for non-beverage crops. We focus here on the non-
beverage crops because they represent the sectors where fertilizer market development activities are currently 
focused.   4
to (1) remove taxes on fertilizer imports and, (2) to limit free or subsidized distribution of 
fertilizer to officially sanctioned fertilizer demonstrations and emergency programs (a 
response to complaints by the private sector that uncontrolled distribution of free and 
subsidized fertilizer by donors and NGOs was making it difficult to sell at remunerative 
prices). Shortly after the implementation of these reforms, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Animal Resources, and Forestry (MINAGRI) and the Agricultural and Rural Market 
Development Project (ARMDP) launched their fertilizer demonstration programs in an effort 
to increase fertilizer demand.  
 
The positive impact of these reforms and programs is seen in the increase in fertilizer dealers, 
the relative stability of fertilizer prices, survey evidence showing an increase in fertilizer use 
by farmers benefiting from ARMDP advisory services, and growth of fertilizer imports for 
non-beverage food crops. In 2001 there were 22 private fertilizer dealers, up from 5 in 1998.  
The increased number of dealers provided enough competition in the market to keep fertilizer 
prices in a relatively stable range (Figure 1).  Average prices for each type of fertilizer ranged 
from a  low of 217 RwF/kg for DAP to 229 and 230 RwF/kg for urea and NPK, respectively. 
The standard deviations around the means ranged from 6 RwF/kg for DAP to 8 RwF/kg for 
NPK and 10 RwF/kg for urea.
3 DAP stands out as the fertilizer with the lowest absolute price 





Figure 1. Stability in fertilizer prices from October 2000 through June 2002 
 
  Oct-Dec 00  Jan-March 01  Apr-June 01  July-Sept 01  Oct-Dec 01  Jan-March 02  Apr-June 02 
NPK  233 241  234 224  238 224 219 
DAP  211 220  213 222  223 223 210 
UREA  231 243  226 226  239 222 215 
 














Source: Compiled by ARMDP from PASAR market price data. 
 
                                                 
3 The lower the standard deviation the less variability in the prices across time. 
4 Average cost per kilogram of nutrient is 339 RwF for DAP, 451 RwF for NPK, and 498 RwF for urea.   5
Farmers participating in the ARMDP program in Gitarama (the only province for which 
ARMDP input use data are currently available) are responding well to the combination of 
good supply, stable prices, and advisory services. The percent of farmers using modern inputs 
(particularly fertilizers) increased from 10 to 15 fold in some districts between the 2001A and 
the 2002A season 




food crops grew at a 
rate of 186% from 
1999 through the 
end of 2000 and at 
196% the following 
year (Table 2). Because planting and fertilizer application for the 2002A season took place 
during September and October of 2001, the increase in 2000A fertilizer demand suggested by 
data presented in Table 1 would have contributed to an increase in imports during 2001. The 
rapid growth of imports documented for 1999 through 2001disappears, however, in the first 
half of 2002. Import statistics through June of 2002 suggest that a slowdown in the rate of 
growth is now taking place: 2017 tons imported this year versus 2357 tons for the same 
period in 2001.
5  
Because the private 
sector has 
responded so well 
during the past three 
years and there were 
some carry over 
stocks at the end of 
2001, most analysts 
believe the apparent 
stagnation in fertilizer imports is due to slow growth in effective demand.  Although there is 
evidence from ARMDP surveys that their package of advisory services is having a positive 
impact on farmer demand for inputs (Table 1) the aggregate growth in fertilizer demand is 
not being sustained. This raises concerns (1) that the demonstration programs put in place are 
not convincing the targeted farmers that fertilizer use is profitable and/or (2) that there may 
be a need for supplementary efforts to improve farmers’ ability to access fertilizer once they 
are convinced of the potential profitability (e.g., credit or assistance with storage and output 
marketing, and market information services to reduce price risks). As a variety of reports on 
Rwanda’s recent demonstration programs have recently become available,
6 it is now possible 
to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the programs and assess how well they are 
serving as a vehicle for rapidly increasing agricultural productivity and crop incomes. 
 
                                                 
5 The two principle sources of fertilizer import data are the Banque National de Rwanda and the Customs Office.  
Although they both compile import statistics from the same basic forms completed by importers and presented 
to the customs service at the time of importation, there are often differences in the quantities of fertilizer imports 
reported. The differences appear to be due to less capacity at the Customs Office to rapidly enter the data and 
different procedures for compiling information from form 126 bis, which is used to report small quantities of 
imports passing through customs post such as Cyanika (personal communication Abt/USAID Agricultural 
Policy Development Project). Numbers in Table 2 are based on official BNR statistics adjusted using data on 
imports through Cyanika.  
6 Desai 2002, Kelly et al. 2002, ARMDP April and July 2002. 




















Type of input 
Ntongwe    902    2   21  Fertilizer 






Taba 1117  17  42  Fertilizer 
    Source: ARMDP data. 







1998  3780  Last year of EU import/subsidy program 
1999    731  Pre-reforms 
2000  2094  Early post-reform period 
2001  6126  Moving ahead (demonstrations begin) 
2002 (to June 30
th only)  2017  Slowing down (June 2001 = 2357 tons) 
Source: BNR data and ARMDP information on imports at Cyanika.   6
4.   2001B MINAGRI FERTILIZER DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
In 2000 an updated FSRP/FAO analysis of fertilizer response and profitability in Rwanda 
became available providing decision makers, NGOs, fertilizer dealers, and extension service 
personnel with guidelines on the crops and zones where fertilizer use was most likely to be 
profitable and recommendations on the types and quantities of fertilizer to apply (Kelly and 
Murekezi).
7  These analyses showed that by switching from earlier recommendations using 
NPK (primarily 17-17-17 supplied through bilateral aid agreements) to a combination of 
DAP and urea, it was possible to reduce fertilizer costs and increase profitability. At a 
workshop where these recommendations were presented, there was strong support among the 
technical scientists and policy analysts for moving in this direction so long as the switch was 
accompanied by monitoring of changes in soil quality (particularly evidence of potassium 
depletion, soil acidification or loss of soil organic matter).  The recommendations of the 
report were that (1) fertilizer promotion programs should introduce DAP and urea 
fertilization techniques to farmers and (2) both fertilizer suppliers and those involved in 
programs to stimulate demand should focus their activities on crops and zones where 
fertilizer use was most likely to be profitable (zones labeled with a “green light” in the 
FSRP/FAO report).  
 
Although there was no official announcement changing fertilizer recommendations from 
NPK to DAP and urea, MINAGRI launch a series of demonstrations for the 2001B season to 
introduce these DAP/urea recommendations to farmers and evaluate the results. The 
demonstration sites (shown in Figure 2) were selected to represent the most profitable 
outcomes reported in FSRP/FAO analyses for each of the five MINAGRI focus crops: Irish 
potatoes, maize, sorghum, climbing beans, and soybeans. DVC/FSRP/GRCS worked together 
in the design of the program while DVC took major responsibility for implementation 
(training, placing inputs, monitoring progress and collecting data to evaluate the 
demonstrations) and FSRP took major responsibility for the analysis of data collected.
8 
 
Kelly et al. 2002 describe the demonstration protocol, report the results of the demonstrations 
(yield response and profitability) and review some of the implementation problems 
encountered. Table 3 summarizes the yield and profitability results for the 278 
demonstrations (of 480 placed) for which data were collected. The results of the 2001B 
demonstration plots contain unequivocal evidence that use of fertilizers on Irish potatoes can 
increase the profitability of potato production and farm income 	
	
agricultural policy and the Rwandan governments poverty reduction program. Surprisingly, 
the average value/cost  (v/c) ratio for Gikongoro (6.06) was higher than that for the traditional 
potato zones in Ruhengeri.  
                                                 
7 Tea and coffee were not covered in this report due to lack of fertilizer response data. 
8 Representatives of other MINAGRI projects working on fertilizer issues (the Abt/USAID Agricultural Policy 
Development Project and the ARMDP) also assisted in the design phase of the program.   7































Cl. Beans   (4)
Sorghum   (4)
Maize   (4)
Ir. Pot   (4)
Maize/Ir. Pot   (4)
Soya/Sorghum   (4)
Cl. Beans/Soya  (4)  8
Table 3. Yield Response and Profitability of MINAGRI 2001B demonstrations to promote 
profitable utilization of DAP and urea fertilizers 
 
Crops/ 






ratio  Comments 
Potatoes : Overall results >>>    73 33  4.3 
Ruhengeri (Butaro, Cyeru) 5B  23  33  3.45 
Byumba (Cyumba, Mukarange) 5B  21  25  2.95 










Aver. v/c for all 
districts >2;  
v/c for four 
districts >4 
(one of four 
>8). 
 
Climbing Beans : Overall results >>>    56 4  1.9 





















   (Nyasibindu) 















2.26.        
 
Maize : Overall results >>>    68 12  1.8 
Cyangugu (Cyimbogo, Gishoma, Gisuma)  2A/B  23    9  1.62 
Ruhengeri (Cyeru, Butaro)  5B  23    8  1.21 
Byumba (Cyumba, Mukarange) 5B  21  19  2.71 
V/C for 
Cyimbogo was 
2.33 but other 




Sorghum : Overall results >>> 
 
34 9  1.5 
Kibungo (Sake, Mugersera) and  









Gitarama (Taba)  4D    8  24  4.17 
Kigali Rural (Rutongo/Shyorongi)  4D    9    4  0.82 
Aver v/c >4 in 
Taba (8 cases) 
but <2 in all 
other districts. 
 
Soybeans : Overall results >>> 
 
47 3  1.60 










Kigali Rural (Rutongo/Shyorongi)  4D    7    1  1.22 
Butaré (Nyasibindu)  4C    8    1  0.61 
Aver v/c >3 in 
Taba (10 cases) 
but <2 in all 
other districts. 
Source: Synthesized from Kelly et al. 2002. 
Notes: All demonstrations used fertilizer doses recommended in Kelly and Murekezi 2000. 
 
(3.45) and Byumba (2.95). The v/c ratio is the value of additional production due to fertilizer use 
divided by the cost of the fertilizer. A v/c ratio 


profitability necessary to stimulate fertilizer demand among small farmers in SSA. 
 
Overall results for other crops do not yet provide strong evidence that all farmers, given their 
current capacity to use fertilizer, will increase incomes through fertilizer use. Nevertheless, there 
is a sufficient number of farmers meeting or exceeding the fertilizer responses and v/c ratios 
reported for previous trials and demonstrations that continued efforts to train farmers in the use 
of fertilizers appears warranted.  This is particularly true for maize where 21 farmers in Byumba 
did very well. For sorghum and soybeans, the performance of farmers in Taba provides some   9
evidence that the fertilizers promoted by the demonstrations can produce good results. 
Unfortunately, the number of observations in Taba is limited (eight for sorghum and ten for 
soybeans). The very poor performance by farmers in other districts suggests the need for careful 
analysis of the reasons behind this poor performance. Follow-up interviews are also 
recommended for farmers in Taba to confirm that their perceptions of the good results conform 
to the data received.  
 
Results for climbing beans were generally poor. Although two of the six districts with climbing 
beans had v/c ratios greater than two, many farmers in these districts planted their 
demonstrations on smaller than recommended plots. This resulted in the use of higher than 
recommended rates of fertilizer per unit area. When the v/c ratios were corrected for these higher 
doses of fertilizer, average v/c results for all districts were below two. Also the average yield 
response across all districts (ranging from 2 to 5 kg/are) was generally less than half the 
anticipated response (12 kg/are) reported in the FSRP/FAO analysis. 
 
These poor results are due, at least in part, to the fact that the breadth of coverage attempted by 
the 2001B demonstration program clearly exceeded MINAGRI financial and human resources. 
The principle problems encountered were (1) late distribution of inputs to some farmers, (2) 
inadequate training of most participant farmers that resulted in incorrect application of inputs by 
many, and (3) poor supervision of data collection that resulted in 42% of demonstrations having 
no data available for analysis.  
 
Following this experience, DVC recommended that future demonstration programs be limited to 
one province per season and then rotated into new provinces each season; but in 2002A 
resources were not available for even a very limited program in one province. During the 2002A 
season, the ARMDP was the only official program involved in fertilizer demonstrations. 
 
 
5.  2002A ARMDP FERTILIZER DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
The ARMDP is not a fertilizer demonstration program per se but a broader program with 
multiple components aimed at stimulating agricultural productivity growth and improving 
agricultural input and output markets in Rwanda. One means employed by the project to achieve 
its objectives is the provision of advisory services offering technical and management training to 
lead farmers, representatives of farmers organizations, and traders. Training of the lead 
farmers began in late 2000 and in late 2001 these farmers had put in place about 2000 
demonstration plots for the 2002A season.  
 
Unlike the MINAGRI fertilizer demonstration program, which selected districts strictly on the 
basis of potential fertilizer profitability, the ARMDP used a broader range of selection criteria. 
The criteria included (1) the presence of agricultural projects, NGOs, and farmers’ associations 
able to assist with project implementation, (2) the availability of ARMDP baseline survey data 
(an important pre-requisite for evaluating project impact), and (3) evidence of fertilizer 
profitability reported in the FSRP/FAO report. Because the first two criteria often received more 
weight than the third one, ARMDP found itself conducting some fertilizer demonstrations for   10
crop/zone combinations where there were no FSRP/FAO green lights for profitable fertilizer 
use.  
Desai (2002) reviewed ARMDP demonstration plot reports and noted that only 28% of the 40 
individual crop/district/treatment situations covered resulted in average v/c ratios >2. 
Compounding the problem of low profitability was a high rate (45% of 40 situations) of v/c 
ratios <0, which means that farmers would have lost money had they paid for their inputs. Part of 
the poor yields is thought to be due to late input delivery and planting 	

	
project implementation. However, the possibility of inappropriate fertilizer doses cannot be 
eliminated because there were many demonstrations conducted for crop/zone combinations 
where the underlying profitability analysis did not exist and numerous other demonstrations that 
did not follow the profitability-based recommendations reported by FSRP/FAO. Table 4 
summarizes the results of a subset (243 of about 2000) of the ARMDP demonstrations that (1) 
concerned crop/zone combinations with a “green light” for profitability from FSRP/FAO and (2) 
for which ARMDP farmers used DAP and urea instead of NPK.
9  Overall v/c results across the 
four crops (potatoes, climbing beans, maize, and soybeans) are all >2 except for climbing beans 
(v/c 1.2). These overall results for DAP/urea treatments are better than the MINAGRI  results 
(Table 3) where only potatoes exhibited an average v/c>2, and among the better results across 
the other demonstrations conducted by ARMDP and described in the previous paragraph. These 
results suggest that profitability is more likely when DAP and urea are used for crop/zone 
combinations given the “green light” for profitability in the FSRP/FAO report. 
 
A technical issue that requires attention is the level of DAP/urea applied in demonstrations 
targeted at zones covered by the FSRP/FAO recommendations. For example, doses of DAP and 
urea applied to ARMDP climbing beans and maize demonstrations far exceeded those 
recommended by FSRP/FAO. Furthermore, the ratio of DAP to urea is reversed for maize in 
Bugarama (i.e., more DAP than urea rather than more urea than DAP). Although there is a 
benefit in training farmers to apply different rates and compare results, at this point in the 
process of developing fertilizer demand it would appear more prudent to focus on 
demonstrations that call for well tested application rates that have passed the “profitability” test. 
When this is not possible, a limited number of well controlled and implemented trials would be 
more appropriate than a large number of diverse demonstrations that risk discouraging fertilizer 
use among the many participating farmers who are likely to have poor results. 
 
In summing up its demonstration plot results, the ARMDP report states: “Apart for the Irish 
potato, the profitability due to the fertilizer application is not obvious.” 
 
The report then goes on to plan for a doubling of demonstrations for the 2002B season whereby 
the lead farmers will again conduct their own demonstrations but also assist three other farmers 
to implement them.  There is no discussion in the report of the need to evaluate the causes of the 
low response and profitability or to re-examine some of the fertilizer doses applied during the 
2002A season. ARMDP is currently using the number of demonstrations conducted as a 
performance indicator. This indicator could be pushing the project to rapidly expand 
demonstrations rather than taking the time to evaluate the causes of the many unprofitable 
                                                 
9 We do not attempt to interpret the other demonstrations conducted by ARMDP as we have no information 
available for evaluating the appropriateness of the doses recommended and no benchmark against which to compare 
the results.   11
outcomes.  Incorporating a slightly different or additional evaluation criteria such as the number 
of demonstrations obtaining v/c ratios >2 might be a way of improving the demonstrations as 
well as fertilizer uptake by farmers.  
 
Table 4. Yield Response and Profitability of ARMDP (2002A) demonstrations using 
DAP/urea for crops and zones identified as profitable by FSRP/FAO  
Crops/ 








Potatoes : crop average>>   111  44  4.3 
  Gikongoro 
   (Mudasomwa) 
   (Musebeya) 

















Urea applied was conform with 
K/M. 
DAP applied was less than 
recommendations in K/M (90 vs. 
110 kg/ha recommended). Note 
that other demos with NPK (not 
shown) performed less well than 
DAP/urea. 
Climbing Beans : crop 
average >> 
  79 11  1.2 
 Cyangugu (Bugarama) 









Fertilizer doses exceeded 
recommendations in K/M . 
Zone 1 : 150 DAP + 50 urea vs. 
80 + 30 kg/ha recommended;  
Zone 4D : 150 DAP + 50 urea vs. 
100 kg/ha DAP recommended  
Maize : crop average >>    53  10  2.6 
Cyangugu (Bugarama) 
Gitarama (Ntongwe) 
2B    
4C 
 







Fertilizer not conform with K/M. 
Zone 2B : 100 DAP + 60 urea vs. 
90 +120 kg/ha recommended. 
Zone 4C : 100 DAP + 100 urea 
vs. 60 + 60 kg/ha recommended. 
Soybeans : crop average >>    34 4  2.2 
Gitarama (Ntongwe) 
  
4C 34  4  2.2 
DAP slightly higher than K/M.  
100 DAP vs. 90 kg/ha DAP 
recommended 
Source : Compiled from ARMDP quarterly reports and Desai 2002. 
Notes : K/M refers to fertilizer recommendations made in Kelly and Murekezi 2000. 
 
 
6.  KEY CONCLUSIONS FROM BOTH SETS OF DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
This review illustrates the important contribution that a relatively small effort to collect 
demonstration plot data can make to the analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in 
demonstration program design and implementation; both MINAGRI and ARMDP should be 
commended for their efforts to add research and monitoring components to their demonstrations. 
 
Although the principle goal of the MINAGRI program was to rapidly increase fertilizer uptake 
by focusing on the crops and zones with the highest profit potential, the program was too 
ambitious and suffered from poor implementation. A large number of demonstrations were not 
profitable due to incorrect use of inputs, late planting, and so forth.  An even larger number were 
monitored so poorly that no data were collected or those that were could not be evaluated. No 
survey was conducted after the demonstrations to evaluate the impact of the program on farmers’   12
decisions to use fertilizer during the 2002A season, but the generally poor program 
implementation suggests that few farmers would have been convinced that fertilizer use was 
profitable and worth adopting. 
 
The ARMDP did not focus as much as MINAGRI did on selecting the zones, crops and fertilizer 
doses likely to be the most profitable. Although this lack of focus on profitability limited 
ARMDP’s ability to rapidly increase farmers’ confidence in fertilizer profitability and thereby 
stimulate fertilizer demand, the ARMDP program was much better implemented and monitored 
than the MINAGRI program (e.g., data collected on 1284 of the 2000 demonstrations placed and 
results for DAP/urea applications better than those of MINAGRI). Both the MINAGRI and 
ARMDP programs were pilot projects, so it is appropriate for us to take stock of lessons learned 
from these two experiences at this time and make recommendations for improved demonstration 
plot programs in the future. 
 
 
7.  MOVING FORWARD WITH FERTILIZER DEMONSTRATIONS 
 
In moving forward, we take as given the estimate that potential demand for fertilizer in Rwanda 
is a minimum of 23,000 tons per year (Kelly et al. 2001, Desai 2001).  We also take as given the 
idea that demand is currently a more important problem than supply. Desai (2002) notes that in 
the early stages of fertilizer market development two processes for increasing fertilizer demand 
predominate: Increasing the number of farmers adopting fertilizer and  increasing the number of 
crops a farmer fertilizers. 
 
Farmers’ perceptions of fertilizer profitability are generally considered the most important 
determinants of these processes, hence, options for rapidly increasing fertilizer demand from the 
current level of approximately 8,000 tons to its 23,000-ton potential need to focus on improving 
farmers’ understanding of fertilizer profitability.  
 
To accomplish this, Desai has proposed a public sector National Fertilizer Demonstration 
Program that (1) focuses on zones and crops with the greatest promise of fertilizer profitability 
(i.e., the “green light” zones in the FSRP/FAO report) and (2) conducts the demonstrations in a 
manner that focuses farmers’ attention on the increased profits they can realize if they use 
fertilizers correctly.  He argues that demonstration programs promoting fertilizers have 
traditionally been the responsibility of the public sector (e.g. ministries of agriculture and 
government extension services in many developing countries, land-grant universities attached to 
state governments in the United States). He also notes that it is inappropriate at the initial stages 
of input market development to expect fertilizer dealers to invest resources in demonstrations 
because of the important investments they need to make in warehousing, building stocks, and 
managing transportation. Desai further argues that permitting fertilizer demonstrations on 
crop/zone combinations for which there is not adequate documentation of profitability dilutes the 
demonstration program and prevents it from increasing fertilizer demand as rapidly as it could be 
increased if all resources were first invested in the profitable “green light” crop/zone 
combinations.  
   13
Despite the evidence from other countries in favor of publicly funded and managed fertilizer 
promotion programs, the MINAGRI 2001B experience suggests that there would need to be 
major changes in human resources and budget if the MINAGRI were to take on the 
responsibility for conducting a wide scale fertilizer demonstration program. Key issues that 
would need to be addressed in designing such a program are: 
 
•  What would such a program cost in terms of personnel, annual budget, and capital 
investments?  
•  From where would the human and financial resources to implement such a program 
come? 
•  To what extent should/could the private sector (fertilizer distributors, NGOs, crop 
exporters or processors) contribute? 
•  What types of policies would be needed to ensure that private sector participants were 
objectively promoting input use that was in the farmers’ interest rather than that which 
might increase upstream or downstream profits at the expense of farm profits? 
•  How would this program relate to the recently launched Rural Sector Support Project 
being funded through a World Bank loan?  
•  What type of research or extension activities should be carried out for zones where 
adequate information for making fertilizer recommendations is not available? 
•  Should these zones be entirely ignored in the early stages of fertilizer promotion or 
should there be an active research/extension program carried out as a preliminary step 
leading up to fertilizer promotion programs? 
 
We concur with Desai concerning the importance of a demonstration plot component in any 
Rwandan effort to promote more rapid expansion of fertilizer use. We believe that expansion of 
the demonstration program should be targeted at crop/zone combinations where farmers’ 
knowledge remains the principal constraint. However, when knowledge is no longer the principle 
constraint, other activities will be needed. For a crop/zone combination where the majority of 
farmers are convinced of fertilizer profitability and have mastered fertilizer techniques (potato 
growers in zone 5B of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri may be close to this), the demonstration programs 
should be scaled down and supplemented by activities designed to improve access and reduce 
risk (e.g., credit, management training for farmers’ associations). 
 
Having carefully examined the recent evidence on fertilizer import growth, demonstration plot 
results, and the Desai proposal for a concerted MINAGRI fertilizer demonstration program, we 
have developed the following set of specific recommendations for consideration by MINAGRI 
as it moves forward with its fertilizer promotion activities. 
 
(1)  Change official publication of fertilizer recommendations in the Agenda Agricole to 
include DAP/urea combinations recommended in the FSRP/FAO report and confirmed 
by the MINAGRI and ARMDP demonstration programs. 
(2)  Supplement the recommendations published in the Agenda Agricole with information on 
factors influencing profitability (yield response potential and input/output price ratios 
used in the analysis). 
(3)  To ensure a multi-disciplinary approach to fertilizer recommendations that takes into 
account crop productivity, farm-level profitability, and environmental impacts, a   14
multidisciplinary team (economist, agronomist, and soil scientist at a minimum) should 
be assigned the task of drafting the Agenda Agricole recommendations and updating 
them each year to incorporate price changes and lessons learned from new research or 
analysis of demonstration plot data. 
(4)  The MINAGRI should promote a program of soil monitoring in zones of highest 
fertilizer consumption to ascertain the continued appropriateness of recommendations 
(e.g., changes in soil acidity, potassium levels, soil organic matter, or increased erosion). 
(5)  The MINAGRI should encourage better use of the media for disseminating information 
on fertilizer recommendations, profitability and prices (perhaps in conjunction with 
weekly reports on market prices); this information should be targeted at farmers as well 
as traders and NGOs assisting farmers. 
(6)  The MINAGRI should advocate fertilizer promotion policies and programs (a) that are 
first targeted to crop/zone combinations with the highest potential for fertilizer 
profitability, then gradually expanded to less profitable crop/zone combinations and (b) 
that take into account non-knowledge constraints such as access or output market 
development problems when they emerge in zones where improved knowledge has 
stimulated interest in fertilizer use but effective demand remains a constraint.  
(7)  In targeted zones, local field days and competitions among farmers should be considered 
as means of increasing interest in the demonstration plots. 
(8)  All institutions involved in fertilizer demonstrations should cooperate in designing and 
using the same monitoring and evaluation methods so that a standard set of data is 
collected for each demonstration plot (area, yield, fertilizer dose, v/c ratio, 
accompanying practices such as manure, lime, etc.) and made available for use in an 
annual report that synthesizes results for the entire country. 
(9)  A workshop of key actors concerned with fertilizer demand and supply should be 
convened annually to discuss the results of the fertilizer demonstration analyses, trends 
in fertilizer imports and distribution, etc. with the goal of identifying bottlenecks and 
designing improvements to be implemented for the following year.  
 
Those implementing the sixth recommendation should select only districts with at least one crop 
that has already been shown to respond profitably to fertilizer (“green lights” in FSRP/FAO 
report) and then determine the relative importance of the knowledge versus the access constraints 
(methods for doing this in a cost-effective manner need to be developed). Limited funds should 
then be allocated across knowledge-building and access-enhancing programs in a manner that 
takes into account the relative importance of these two constraints. For example, where the 
principal constraint is farmers’ knowledge (e.g., maize producers in Umutara), demonstration 
programs using the most profitable fertilizer recommendations should be the focus. For 
crop/zone combinations where the principal constraint is no longer farmers’ knowledge, 
resources should be transferred to activities that reduce risk or improve access (e.g., 
strengthening farmers’ associations and their ability to obtain and manage credit, encouraging 
traders and banks to offer input credit, or strengthening output demand and market performance). 
It will also be important to develop transition plans for switching the emphasis from 
demonstration programs to access promotion programs at the appropriate time. The ultimate 
success of the program will then depend on the development of plans for exiting the access 
promotion programs at the appropriate time and moving on to new districts. 
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In addition to providing insights about what should be done to promote rapid growth in efficient, 
profitable use of fertilizers, the recent demonstration programs provide some lessons on pitfalls 
to avoid. We summarize the key lessons below: 
 
(1) Don’t do fertilizer demonstrations for crop/zone combinations where there is not well-
established evidence of profitability.  For example, if working in Ntongwe, where there is 
a “green light” for fertilizer profitability on climbing beans, maize, and soybeans but not 
for potatoes and rice, demonstrations should not be conducted on potatoes and rice.  This 
does not mean potatoes (with a yellow light signaling proceed with caution) and rice (no 
data available) should be ignored in this district if they are crops being grown by farmers; 
it means that extension and research should work with a limited number of farmers using 
on-farm trials to identify the appropriate doses and deal with the plant disease problems 
that led to the yellow light recommendation for potatoes (see Kelly and Murekezi 2000 for 
details). 
(2) Don’t do fertilizer demonstrations on crop/zone combinations with a red light indicating 
that fertilizer use is not profitable (unless subsequent price changes or the introduction of 
new crop varieties render fertilizer profitable in these crops/zones) 
(3) Don’t do fertilizer demonstrations for crop/zone combinations where no prior data are 
available (white districts on the maps in the FSRP/FAO study), but develop on-farm trials 
that (1) are supervised more closely than demonstrations by both research and extension 
personnel, and (2) test a variety of levels (minimum of 3 different levels each) of N, P, 
and K fertilizers permitting the estimation of production functions, (3) analyze the results 
and identify doses with v/c ratios 
10, (4) once satisfied that a profitable dose has been 
identified move to demonstrations comparing farmers current practices with the 
recommended fertilizer treatment. 
(4) Don’t do more fertilizer demonstrations than necessary to establish and maintain general 
agreement among farmers that fertilizer use is profitable and desirable. 
 
 
8.  MOVING FORWARD ON INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
We think that the experiences of the past few years have taught us a lot about fertilizer potential 
for non-beverage food crops and stimulating fertilizer supply in Rwanda. Because of sound 
public sector facilitating and regulatory policies, private sector firms have significantly increased 
fertilizer supplies. We have also gained some important insights about how to proceed with 
making improvements in fertilizer demonstrations and other fertilizer promotion activities.  
Moving forward with fertilizer promotion programs is unlikely to happen, however, if a number 
of very important institutional issues are not resolved.  During the past three years the MINAGRI 
has relied on project personnel and resources for much of the fertilizer policy analysis and 
demonstration program implementation. Consequently, there is not yet an obvious “institutional 
home” in MINAGRI with the human and financial capacity to carry out the many tasks that will 
be required to push forward with the design of an expanded fertilizer promotion program much 
less with the coordination, implementation, and monitoring. A similar problem of capacity and 
financial resources exists at the Institut des Sciences Agronomiques du Rwanda (ISAR), the 
                                                 




recommendation that takes into account the risks involved in fertilizer use.   16
logical home for fertilizer research. As three of the projects that have been providing support to 
fertilizer policy analysis and project implementation are rapidly drawing to a close,
11 the GOR 
should be thinking about how to find appropriate and sustainable institutional homes for the 
coordination and conduct of fertilizer policy, research, and promotion activities. Some of the 
questions that need resolution at the central level are: 
 
•  Who should coordinate the design and implementation of Rwanda’s fertilizer promotion 
and research program? 
o  An existing or new institution or department of government 
o  A special project or committee composed of both foreign and national consultants 
representing a wide range of stakeholders (farmers, government, fertilizer 
distributors, NGOs) 
o  Something else? 
•  Who should participate in the design and implementation activities? 
o  Which departments of MINAGRI 




o  What other ministries or government services  
o  What non-governmental institutions  
o  What businesses (e.g., banks, input distributors, agricultural exporters) 
•  Who should do the monitoring and evaluation of programs once implemented? 
•  What will be the cost of design, implementation, and evaluation? 
•  From where will the funding come in the short-run? In the long run? 
•  Will there be resources to maintain a fertilizer research and promotion program that is 
capable of providing farmers services as their fertilizer needs evolve or special problems 
are encountered? 
 
Additional questions concerning local implementation of fertilizer demonstrations and research 
also need to be addressed: 
 
•  What institution or institutions should be responsible for local management, 
implementation, and monitoring of results? 
o  Government extension services 
o  NGOs, special projects or consultants 
o  A combination of the above? 
•  To what extent will decentralization affect the ability of local governments to design, 
fund, and implement their own programs?   
 
Although the preceding list of questions concern what needs to be done to develop a successful 
fertilizer promotion program, one cannot separate the issue of what needs to be done in fertilizer 
from what needs to be done for agricultural policy analysis, research and extension in general. If 
Rwanda already had a well-functioning system in place to conduct agricultural policy analysis, 
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research, and extension, we would not be asking the above questions. Our recommendation is 
that the GOR use the design of a priority program to promote fertilizer as an opportunity to 
develop a more coherent and better-articulated institutional framework for conducting all of its 
agricultural policy, research, and extension activities. 
 
As there is no single one-size-fits-all solution to developing a successful fertilizer promotion 
program, the GOR needs to answer the questions on the previous page by examining the 
strengths and weaknesses of alternative programs. The GOR has experimented with a variety of 
approaches to extension services that could be used to implement a fertilizer promotion program.  
In this paper we have briefly discussed the strengths and weaknesses of two public sector 
programs that have focused on fertilizer promotion using different approaches: 
 
•  The MINAGRI program carried out primarily by DVC and DSA staff at the national 
level (with some financial and technical assistance from the FSRP project) and district 
agronomists at the local level; the program relied on “model” farmers who had 
participated in MINAGRI technical training programs in the recent past but had not yet 
benefited from any practical experience with fertilizer applications. 
•  The ARMDP program that was carried out by project-funded staff housed in the 
MINAGRI collaborating with district-level agronomists and NGOs who were contracted 
by the project to provide a variety of farmer advisory services; the extension model used 
was one of “lead” farmers who would be trained and then assisted with their 
demonstration plots the first year. The following year the lead farmer is expected to 
assist three additional farmers conduct demonstration plots. 
 
In addition to these two recent government sponsored efforts, there are a variety of past and 
current projects that have been funded by multilateral or bilateral donors working in 
collaboration with the government.  For example: 
 
•  The PEARL project, which is promoting a U.S. style extension service built on 
promoting strong university, research, and extension links that are largely funded and 
implemented at the provincial or district level. 
•  The Rural Sector Support project, which is just getting underway, anticipates using an 
extension model similar to the one tested by ARMDP with both NGOs and district 
agronomists involved.  A slight modification of the ARMDP experience that has been 
discussed is a stronger focus on district agronomists12 as the direct link to farmers with 
NGOs being used more for training district agronomists than for direct training of 
farmers.  
•  The Projet de Gestion des Espaces Ruraux de Buberuka (PGERB) a program funded by 
IFAD and implemented by the DSRA in Ruhengeri; the project  conducted agricultural 
demonstrations in all districts of Ruhengeri in 2001B and 2002A, many of which were 
fertilizer demonstrations. 
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•  Private sector and parastatal efforts where exporters or processors of high value crops 
provide inputs and extension services to farmers (for example, tomatoes grown for the 
local tomato processor, sorghum grown for industrial breweries, OCIR tea and coffee).  
 
Each of these examples represents a different combination of government and private sector 
actors and funding and a different set of outcomes. To the extent that written documentation 
exists, a careful review of the strengths and weaknesses of each program should provide 
additional input that could be used to answer the list of questions posed on the previous page 
about who should do what and with what type of funding.  
 
Finally, it may also be useful to consult with experts knowledgeable about programs developed 
elsewhere in SSA that exhibit similarities to the Rwandan situation and assess the extent to 
which these experiences may contribute to the design of an appropriate fertilizer promotion 
program for Rwanda. 
 
Since there is no on-size-fits-all solution, the most likely outcome would be a heterogeneous 
extension and fertilizer promotion program in Rwanda that takes into account the special 
characteristics of different crops and types of production systems. In cases where there is 
potential for private sector extension and credit, the government role may be one of facilitator 
rather than implementer.  Facilitation in such cases often takes the form of providing market 
information that brings farmers and exporters or processors together, training that enhances the 
capacity of individual farmers or farmers’ organizations to negotiate fair terms, and 
improvements in the judicial system ensuring that contracts can be enforced and penalties 
imposed for non-compliance. 
 
Although there may be some situations where the private sector is willing to shoulder a large 
share of input promotion activities, experience in Rwanda and elsewhere suggests that there are 
many crops for which it will be difficult to get the private sector involved. These crops tend to be 
local food crops for which there is no export market or industrial processing demand. In these 
cases, it is likely that the GOR will need to play the role of coordinator, facilitator and, in some 
cases, implementer of fertilizer promotion programs and demonstration plots. 
 
Rwanda has made amazing progress in moving from a government and donor controlled 
fertilizer distribution system to a private sector system in a very short period of time, yet much 
remains to be done if Rwanda is to realize the full potential that fertilizer offers for increasing 
crop productivity, rural incomes, and aggregate GDP. Resolving these institutional issues with 
the appropriate balance of GOR/donor funding, public/private implementation, and central/local 
participation is the next important step in moving toward a effective fertilizer promotion program 
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 Annex: Time-line of fertilizer policy and projects in Rwanda  
 
  Date  Important benchmarks affecting fertilizer demand and supply 
1970s/80s  Strong emphasis on organic farming methods; use of inorganic fertilizers discouraged. 
Late 1980s to 
early 1990s 
FAO and bilateral donors assist GOR/ISAR with fertilizer research (trials to determine 
appropriate doses, demonstrations to familiarize farmers with fertilizer); research continued to 
emphasize importance of combining organic and inorganic fertilizers and appropriate use of lime 
on acid soils. 
1995-98  EU imported fertilizers that were sold at subsidized prices to NGOs and input dealers as part of 
post-war recovery program; sales volume was low (<3000 tons/yr) and credit repayment was a 
problem; private sector complained of unfair competition from NGOs distributing fertilizers free 
or below cost. 
1997  National workshop on fertilizer united Rwandan and international experts in crop production and 
soil fertility issues; general consensus that Rwanda needed to increase use of inorganic fertilizers 
but little concrete action taken following workshop. 
1999  FSRP/FAO/MINAGRI hold workshop and publish report, which updates profitability analysis of 
fertilizer use by crop and agrobioclimatic zone; report shows strong potential for profitable use of 
fertilizers in many (but not all) parts of Rwanda. 
2000  GOR implements two major policy changes and ARMDP project begins; policy changes included 
(1) no free or subsidized fertilizer distribution without written MINAGRI permission and (2) 
temporary removal of fertilizer ICHA (15%) and customs duties (5%) for three years, followed 
by possible renew for two additional years. 
2000-2002  Fertilizer imports for non-beverage crops increase from 731 to 2094 and then to 6126 tons from 
1999 to 2001; aggregate imports do not increase in first half of 2002. Number of fertilizer 
importers increases from 5 in 1998 to 22 in 2001 and the diversity of import sources/routes 
increases. Line of Credit for importers provided by ARMDP project contributes to increases but 
remains under-utilized because banks and traders were able to mobilize their own funds for 90% 
of the imports. ARMDP program of input credit facility to farmers offered through Banques 
Populaires began in October 2001 and appears to be working well. 
2001  (a) MINAGRI/USAID policy workshop on fertilizer use and marketing results in proposed action 
plan to increase fertilizer consumption from 2000 levels of  8000* tons to 23000 tons over a 
period of 3 years (5000 tons per year). 
(b) MINAGRI conducts a series of fertilizer demonstrations during 2001B season focused on the 
zones identified in FSRP/FAO profitability analysis as the most likely to realize high returns for 
the five crops targeted by MINAGRI programs: potatoes, maize, sorghum, soybeans, climbing 
beans. 
(c) ARMDP begins their program of advisory services for the adoption of modern farm inputs 
and access to credit; 18 districts are selected for the pilot program, with preference given to 
districts with farmers associations and NGOs having the competence to implement program. 
Fertilizer demonstrations are conducted as a part of the program but, unlike MINAGRI 
demonstration program, FSRP/FAO recommendations on fertilizer profitability are not the key 
criteria used in selecting districts and fertilizer recommendations. 
2002  (a) Fertilizer Policy Committee created: revises draft action plan from 2001 workshop and 
develops terms of reference for a consultant to further develop an action plan for fertilizer sector. 
(b) Analysis of MINAGRI and ARMDP 2001B fertilizer demonstrations completed**; yield 
response and profitability acceptable for potatoes but results for other crops are highly variable 
suggesting a need to improve both focus and implementation of fertilizer demonstration 
programs. 
* There was some confusion concerning quantities imported in 2000 at the time of the February 2001 workshop and 
the action plan was based on the assumption of 8000 tons rather than the 6126 tons used in subsequent reports. 
**Results and analysis of demonstrations are reported in ARMDP quarterly reports Nos. 01/02 and 03/02, Desai 
2002, and Kelly et al. 2002. 